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DavidMarr’s theory of the archicortex, a brain structure nowmore commonly
known as the hippocampus and hippocampal formation, is an epochal contri-
bution to theoretical neuroscience. Addressing the problem of how
information about 10 000 events could be stored in the archicortex during
the day so that they can be retrieved using partial information and then trans-
ferred to the neocortex overnight, the paper presages a whole wealth of later
empirical and theoretical work, proving impressively prescient. Despite this
impending success, Marr later apparently grew dissatisfied with this style of
modelling, but he went on to make seminal suggestions that continue to res-
onate loudly throughout the field of theoretical neuroscience. We describe
Marr’s theory of the archicortex and his theory of theories, setting them into
their original and a contemporary context, and assessing their impact. This
commentary was written to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the journal
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.1. Introduction
After burning so brightly with his neuroscience work and his later contributions
at the birth of the field of computational vision, David Marr (figure 1) died tragi-
cally young. His archicortex paper comes from the initial phase of his career, in
which he constructed whole intellectual edifices concerning how the cerebellar
cortex, the neocortex and the hippocampus could function as networks for learn-
ing and memory. In his first paper, he discussed how the Purkinje cells of the
cerebellar cortex could learn motor commands [1]. He then outlined how the
neocortex could perform unsupervised learning to store highly processed infor-
mation about inputs and thereby extract categories [2]. His third theory
described how the archicortex, the hippocampus and associated structures,
could function as a simplememoryby storing information directly and temporarily,
prior to further processing in the neocortex [3]. It was this paper that was
published in the Philosophical Transactions. A posthumous book contains a notable
and comprehensive collection of these papers and his other work, including
invited commentaries [4].
The three early papers were strikingly different from all that had come before,
and indeedmost since: Marr articulated computational problems, posed in math-
ematical terms, to be solved by these structures; he suggested how existing
anatomical and physiological knowledge related directly to the computations;
finally, he nailed his modelling colours firmly to themast, making numerous pre-
dictions that were starkly graded according to the severity of their consequences
for the theory were they to be refuted.
Have such refutations indeed happened? We examine this question with a
focus on his theory of the hippocampus [3], also looking more widely at how it
has stood the test of time. Despite being wrong in some details, this work has
been hugely inspirational for other theories and experiments. Marr’s early studies
are of even greater note for the concerns about the overall philosophy and practice
 David Marr - in La Jolla,
CA - 1974
David Marr - as a
schoolboy - 1960
Figure 1. Photographs of David Marr. (a) At school, aged about 12. (b) David
Marr (left) with his colleagues Francis Crick (back) and Tommy Poggio in Cali-
fornia, 1974. Reproduced with kind permissions of Peter Williams (a) and
Lucia Vaina (b).
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that he and Poggio, his close colleague, later crystallized [5].
This analysis was reported in the book Vision [6]. Their ideas
about different levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic
and implementational—have much resonance today, and are
especially relevant to the current debatewithin the neuroscience
community about attempts to build large-scale models of
the brain.
Already in his schooldays, David Marr was developing his
interests far beyond those provided by his formal education in
mathematics and physics. Stimulated by reading books such as
J. W. Dunne’s An Experiment with Time and W. Grey Walter’s
The Living Brain, he became enthused about the possibility of a
‘mathematical theory of the brain itself’. He then went up to
Trinity College Cambridge as a mathematics scholar. After
graduating, he studied physiology and anatomy before becom-
ing a PhD student with Giles Brindley who inspired him to
produce his first theory paper on the cerebellar cortex. He then
secured a Prize Fellowship at Trinity; notably, three of the four
awards that year were to neuroscience, the other recipients
being Tony Gardner-Medwin and Oliver Braddick—later to
become a distinguished physiologist and experimental psychol-
ogist, respectively. During this Fellowship, he completed his two
other early neural papers including the theory of archicortex. In
1970, he joined Sydney Brenner at theMRC Laboratory forMol-
ecular Biology at Cambridge. Sydney encouraged him to
experience at first hand the rising discipline of Artificial Intelli-
gence by visiting Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert at MIT.
This eventually led him to shift his focus towards computation
rather than implementation, and to his long partnership with
Tommy Poggio. Following a brave battle with leukaemia,
David Marr died in 1980.2. Mathematical and computational modelling in
neuroscience
There are three main varieties of theoretical approaches in
neuroscience: data analysis, mathematical modelling and the one
that became clearer through Marr’s later work, namely
computational modelling.
Data analysis involves developing and deploying advan-
ced computational and statistical methods for analysing the
gargantuan volumes of data now being generated by an everwider variety of experimental techniques and assessing the
complex interactions among the multiple entities contained
within these data.
Mathematical modelling involves building formal
reductions based on descriptive and mechanistic models of
natural phenomena associated with the brain over the huge
range of spatial and temporal scales that characterize it.
These reductions have to take into account the complexity
and heterogeneity of the brain’s components. Mathematical
methods and computer simulations are used to explore
whether the mechanisms proposed are capable of accounting
for the phenomena they are intended to explain.
Computational modelling most interested Marr. He looked
upon the brain as a physical device that is performing compu-
tational tasks involving representing, processing and acting
upon information. That the brain can be interpreted as proces-
sing information provides a rich set of constraints on the
mathematical models, whose structure and dynamics have to
be appropriate to accomplish the computational tasks.
Marrdistinguished three levelsof computationalmodelling—
implicitly in his early writing, but later, transparently.
Examples are given in table 1:
(1) The computational level, at which the task and the logic of
its solution is described;
(2) the algorithmic level, which specifies how the information
associated with the computation is represented and the
procedures for performing the relevant manipulations;
and
(3) the implementational level, which describes how the
algorithms are realized in the nervous system.
One recurring theme in his work was the interaction
between levels. This was fluid in his early work, as seen most
clearly in his cerebellar cortex theory, which he developed to
address the beautiful three-dimensional structure of the neur-
onal network of the cerebellar cortex [11], and that had such
an impact among cerebellar physiologists. Equally, his neocor-
tical theory blended categorization, as an implication of the
exciting observations from Hubel & Wiesel of single neurons
in the visual cortex responding selectively to moving lines
and edges tilted at a particular angle [12], with statistical
notions of this operation associated with the then emerging
field of numerical taxonomy, an established focus of research
at Cambridge [13]. This was all under the guidance of a very
careful analysis of neocortical anatomy as implementation.
The algorithmic rendition of his theory of the hippocampus
was strongly influenced by what was then known about the
neuroanatomy, at least up to an impressive point. Some
facets were omitted—for instance, it did not incorporate the
substantial mechanistic complexities of actual neural elements
known at the time, such as the details of spike generation or
synaptic integration via extended dendritic trees.
Marr’s subsequent work, perhaps influenced by the Artifi-
cial Intelligence community at MIT, and perhaps as a reaction
to the overly precise predictions made from the neurobiology
in these earlier papers, focused on insulating computational
and algorithmic levels from the requirements of imple-
mentation [6]. Indeed, a tenet of computational theory is that
the same algorithm can be implemented in distinct ways in
different hardware. Read strictly, this could imply that it is
impossible to generate strong constraints that apply across
computational levels, a restriction that would undermine the
Table 1. Examples of ‘. . .the different levels at which an information-processing device must be understood. . .’ [6] from which example 1 was taken. Example 2
is based on Li and Zhaoping [7,8] and example 3 on Daw et al. and Montague et al. [9,10].
computational algorithmic implementational
1. performing
addition
using Arabic numerals, adding the least
signiﬁcant digits ﬁrst;
using a binary representation
using a machine with 10-toothed wheels;
using logic gates
2. visual salience assessing where the statistical structure of
images changes
dynamical interactions between hypercolumns in V1
3. optimal control learning a model of the world and planning
using the model;
learning the future worth of current actions
state-based prediction errors and working-memory for tree search;
temporal difference prediction errors realized in the phasic activity of
dopamine neurons
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thinking has recognized the potential for well-founded
computational accounts that exploit bothweak and strong con-
straints across levels, and that furthermore tightly integrate
computational and mathematical modelling [14–16].
This discussion of Marr’s approach provides a basis for
understanding the sort of theory of the hippocampus for
which he was aiming, and equally a framework within
which to evaluate the extent to which these aims were met.
After discussing the model and its impact in these terms,
we will return to assess the wider impact of Marr’s modelling
philosophy and methodology.3. Marr’s theory of archicortex
Marr regarded the archicortex’s computational task as acting
as a temporary store of raw information derived from sensory
experience: the hippocampus should memorize patterns of
neural activity representing events as they happen through
the day, with previously memorized patterns being retrieved
when cued by partial information. According to his neocortex
theory, the information stored in the hippocampus would
then be transferred periodically to the neocortex, to be
recoded via self-organization into a more categorical form
[2]. While the hippocampal model, therefore, lacked the
sophistication of the neocortex, building a model of ‘simple
memory’ was nevertheless, he asserted, still a ‘necessary tech-
nical exercise’. A more detailed explication of this exercise is
provided in Willshaw & Buckingham [17].
As in Marr’s two other contemporary neural models, the
archicortex model comprised several layers of interconnected
neurons with the connections specified probabilistically. This
network structure can be traced to the more abstract Per-
ceptron [18], an elegant mathematical account of the latter’s
capabilities having just been published by Minsky & Papert
[19]. The items to be stored in the model (called events) are
represented by patterns of activity over the so-called input
layer of neurons, storage being achieved through synaptic
plasticity. Retrieval occurs when a portion of a previously
stored event is presented to the input layer. Activity is propa-
gated to all the remaining layers through synapses connecting
one to the next, ultimately leading to a pattern of excitation
over the neurons in the final (or output) layer. This output
pattern is called the simple representation of the input pattern.
It is then passed through another set of return synapses ofvariable strength directly back to the input layer. The
synapses each have a binary-valued modifiable component,
being strengthened by the coincidence of presynaptic and
postsynaptic activity. Together with these Hebbian synap-
ses [20], Marr proposed the existence of synapses with a
weak or ‘baseline’ unmodifiable component that would
enable postsynaptic cells to fire when activated (Brindley
synapses—named after Marr’s PhD advisor, Giles Brindley).
On the basis of reasonable calculations, Marr asserted that
events could be stored no faster than one per second, and that
information would be transferred to neocortex overnight,
when there would be no sensory input to provide unwanted
synaptic modification. He, therefore, set the memory capacity
at 105 (approx. the number of seconds in a day). He estimated
the number of neocortical pyramidal nerve cells to be used as
the input layer at 105, and the number in the output layer at
104. Arguing that there would be no capacity for the return
synapses to take part in pattern completion during retrieval,
he assumed that the simple representation was completed in
the output layer before being fed back to the input layer. No
detail was provided about the return projection—the intended
topic of a subsequent paper that sadly did not materialize.
Using his main mathematical result from the cerebellum
paper concerning the number of events that can be stored
and retrieved by a single Purkinje cell, he calculated that a
simple two-layer model with the modifiable synapses connect-
ing the input layer to the output layer directly would be
inadequate, as the proportion of nerve cells active (the activity
level) in a simple representationwould be too low to be reliable.
He, therefore, concentrated on a three-layer model, with
information flowing from input to output through a middle
or codon layer. He assumed that there was a recurrent feedback
loop with modifiable synapses between output layer neurons.
The resulting collateral effect enabled a partially reconstructed
simple representation to be improved gradually, so that the
full simple representation could be reconstructed and sent
back to the input layer through the return pathway.
Marr sought to ensure that (i) the activity levels in the
various layers were not too low; and (ii) each event had a
unique representation in each layer. This implied mathemat-
ical constraints on the parameter values of the system—
principally the activity levels in each layer, the number of
cells in the middle layer and the density of connections
within each group of synapses. It then became crucial to set
the firing thresholds for each nerve cell receiving input
through modifiable synapses, something that he suggested,
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Figure 2. Schematic of a basic unit of Marr’s simple memory model. The
basic unit has two conceptual, connected parts, input (labelled A) and
output (B). ‘A’ shows the horizontally running fibres from the input layer
with modifiable Brindley synapses on cells of the intermediate layer
(‘codon’ cells, of which two are shown, c1 and c2). Inhibitory interneurons
control the threshold for codon cell firing so as to maintain a constant activity
level. Neurons of type S and G supply feed-forward inhibition by the
sampling of input fibre activity; those of type G also provide feedback inhi-
bition by sampling the codon cell activity. Using feedback and feed-forward
inhibition for controlling thresholds in this way was used by Marr in his cer-
ebellum paper [1]. ‘B’ shows codon cell fibres with modifiable synapses on
output cells V1 and V2. Collateral connections from one output cell to
another are also indicated. The threshold of firing on the output cells is con-
trolled by S and G interneurons, as above. In addition, the D cells innervate
the soma to perform a division. Both subtraction and division are needed for
correct threshold setting of the output cells, by means of which the correct
simple representation is gradually recreated from a partial input cue. The
return projection from output cells to input cells is not shown. Adapted
from fig. 5 of Marr [3].
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nation of divisive (somatic) and subtractive (dendritic)
inhibition. In the reconstruction of the simple representation
in the output layer, some cells may be inactive when they
should be active, whereas others may be spuriously active;
via what was described candidly as ‘suitable juggling’ of
the thresholds [3, p. 80], the number of genuinely active
cells would be expected to increase and the number of spur-
iously active cells to decrease, maintaining a constant activity
level, until the full simple representation emergeswith an accu-
racy of a few per cent. Appropriate settings for the thresholds
depend on information about both the number and proportion
of a nerve cell’s afferent synapses that are active in storage
or retrieval. Marr calculated possible values of these two
parameters that, in combination, would yield the desired
memory capacity. He made calculations for different configur-
ations of (probabilistic) connectivity. In some configurations,
connections between all cells in one layer were allowed to the
cells in the next; in others the connections were restricted, to
reflect the topographic organization believed to exist within
some parts of the archicortex. All calculations were made for
105 cells in the output layer rather than the figure of 104 used
initially when he rejected the two-layer model.
Marr incorporated the then available knowledge of the
neuroanatomy of the hippocampus and related brain struc-
ture in great detail. In particular, he suggested that it is the
anatomy of the principal cell types that determines the func-
tion of the archicortex to be a memorizer (in the same way
that the different cell types of the neocortex specify it as a
classifier). The paper is replete with diagrams showing con-
nectivity among neurons within the hippocampal formation
(figure 2). The input layer was proposed to be the pyramidal
cells in neocortex, the stellate cells in entorhinal cortex and
presubiculum formed the codon layer, and the output layer
embraced the dentate gyrus and the CA1, CA2 and CA3 pyr-
amidal cells of the hippocampus; modern interpretations
identify the codon layer with the dentate gyrus and the
output layer with CA3, where there is a known feedback
loop. Marr also suggested how particular memorizing cell
types could be used for threshold setting through inhibition.
Finally, he furnished a large list of predictions accompanied
by numbers of stars: a three-star prediction would dismantle
the theory were it to be disproved; a no-star prediction was
merely a strong hint.4. Marr’s theory in its own time
Marr’s theory hails from an era when much less was known
about the psychological and computational roles of the hip-
pocampus, and indeed its neurobiology. However, there
was still a considerable contemporary psychological and
physiological context which he did not mention (perhaps a
relief to the reader of what is an intricate paper, lacking the
relaxed style of his book Vision [6]).
The development of Marr’s simple memory idea may have
been influenced by the striking observations made on a series
of patients who had been given bilateral surgical resection of
the temporal lobes for the relief of epilepsy [21]. The best
known of these, Henry Molaison (patient HM), experienced
relief from seizures following the operation but,more strikingly,
he displayed profound anterograde amnesia: while he could hold
information in short-term memory for a few minutes, he couldnot form long-term memories. Detailed study of HM through
the 1960s until his death in 2008 by Brenda Milner, Suzanne
Corkin and their students substantiated and elaborated upon
the initial clinical observations [22].
This unexpected finding led immediately to attempts to
model the syndrome in non-human primates and rats. These
efforts were largely unsuccessful as there was no deficit in
learning after damage to the hippocampus. Indeed, contem-
porary hypotheses suggested that the hippocampus may be a
behavioural inhibition system [23] on the basis that hippocam-
pal lesioned rats could learn but had great difficulty in either
giving up or changing learned habits. It was not until some
years later that the first successful animal models of amnesia
were developed [24,25], building on the idea that memory for
events and the capacity to acquire new habits are mediated
by distinct neural systems. Either Marr did not know of these
initial unsuccessful attempts to model the syndrome or,
wisely ignoring them, he focused on the fascinating anatomy
of the hippocampal formation as being ideal for ‘simple
memory’—keeping track of the events of the day in precisely
the way that patient HM could not.(a) Evaluation of the modelling
As noted, Marr’s archicortex model bears a strong family
resemblance to his three other network models of learning
and memory with their three layers of nerve cells
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modifiable synapses. They use the same mechanisms for
synaptic modification and for setting the thresholds on the
firing of cells in the codon and output layers. The principal
differences between the three lie in whether they act as clas-
sifying or memorizing devices (determined by the
anatomy) and the use to which the codon layer is put.
In the cerebellar model, the single output cell is taught to
respond selectively to many different input patterns. An effi-
cient way of producing high storage capacity is to use
patterns with low activity levels. The codon layer acts to
transform the input patterns with high but variable activity
levels into patterns of more constant and lower activity so
as to make any two patterns more distinct from one another
( pattern separation). This is most easily done if the codon layer
contains many more neurons than the input layer, as in the
cerebellum. Marr calculated that 7000 mossy fibres (inputs)
would influence the single Purkinje cell (output cell) through
200 000 granule cells (codons), achieving a reduction in
activity level from between 1 and 25% in the input to 0.25%
in the codon layer. By contrast, in the neocortex model, the
codon cells act to pick out common features of the input pat-
terns to enable each output cell to learn all patterns of a
particular class. For the archicortex model, without ascribing
a specific function to the codon layer, he may have thought it
would facilitate pattern completion (recovery of a stored pattern
from a fragment). There is no pattern separation as the activity
levels are roughly the same in each layer of the model.
Marr’s calculations showed that in his model, simple rep-
resentations could be established and recalled from partial
information. Had it been possible to carry out computer simu-
lations, he might have been able to extend his model to:
(i) investigate how to incorporate the missing final step in his
model of reconstructing the input pattern through the final
feedback pathway and (ii) specify a working threshold-setting
strategy. Most significantly, had he kept the same number of
output layer cells (105) from the outset, rather than switching
from 104 to 105, there would have been no reason to reject the
two-layer model. One major simulation which confirmed the
validity of his assumptions (albeit on a 1/100 size model)
found that the performances of two- and the three-layer
models were broadly equivalent [17,26]. His choice of a
three-layer rather than a two-layer model seems to rest on
using constraints from an implementational rather than a com-
putational perspective. Similar simulation techniques verified
Marr’s calculations for the cerebellummodel [27] and explored
the computations performed in the neocortex model [28].
Marr discussed how to clear the memory periodically, but
without coming to a clear algorithmic solution. Instead of set-
ting all synapses to zero overnight once the patterns had been
re-presented to neocortex, he considered either the selected
deletion of the synapses activated by particular simple rep-
resentations or the gradual decay of all synapses (which he
said requires simpler assumptions). Subsequent work by a
variety of authors has shown that having all synapses
decay lowers memory capacity [29–31].5. Marr’s theory in modern terms
Later in his career, Marr became focused on the computational
level, leading to much debate about his own views about his
earlier models. At the very least, we can see this work as anoble failure—it was an astonishing achievement for a mathe-
matician to synthesize so much disparate data into a whole.
A later review reminded a new generation of neuroscientists
how the combination of specific features of hippocampal anat-
omy coupledwith activity-dependent synaptic plasticity could
mediate distinct components of memory [32]. It also discussed
further concepts such as pattern completion, pattern separation
and the role of sleep in memory reactivation, all mentioned in
Marr’s original works.
(a) Systems consolidation
Marr’s theory that the archicortex acts as a temporary store to
enable events to be appropriately recoded in the neocortex
lies firmly within the domain of long-term memory, rather
than being a limited capacity short-term memory of the kind
used to remember, e.g. telephone numbers. Its interaction
with neocortex is now referred to as ‘systems memory consoli-
dation’. This has been the subject of experimental work for
over a century, but only more recently considered theoretically
[33]. The complementary learning systems framework of
McClelland et al. [34,35] is perhaps the best worked out compu-
tational model of systems memory consolidation, and is very
much in the spirit of Marr’s original ideas. Consolidation is
best seen as a process by which memory traces become stabil-
ized and integrated into neocortical networks that sustain and
expand upon the memory. The standard view is that this pro-
cess is a long and gradual one [33], whereas according to Marr
it would happen over the course of a single night. This distinc-
tion has quantitative implications for understanding the
temporal characteristics of retrograde amnesia, which refers to
the forgetting of information learned prior to damage to the
hippocampus. The experimentally somewhat controversial
prediction is that older memories should be remembered
more proficiently.
The consolidation idea has been refined in several ways.
First, the concept of ‘transfer’ of information from hippo-
campus to cortex is no longer accepted. Instead, parallel
encoding is now considered explicitly, with hippocampal–
neocortical interactions serving to stabilize neocortical traces
selectively. Second, according to a multiple trace theory,
event memory can be subdivided into context-specific episo-
dic memory that is stored in hippocampus (‘what, where and
when’), and semantic memory for ‘facts’ stored in neocortex
[36]. Episodic memory is analogous to Marr’s recording of
events—the memory of things that happen during the day.
Semantic memory is the corpus of factual knowledge
acquired through formal training or from our interpretation
and recoding of events. Third, new work on frameworks of
semantic knowledge in both animals and humans suggests
that activated prior knowledge can guide or at least influence
the process of systems memory consolidation, and thereby
decrease the time it takes [37,38]. These challenge the
notion that the simple memory is the only fast component
of the system. Even in the complementary learning systems
framework, the gradual creation of categories in neocortex
occurs using plasticity mechanisms that are just as fast in
the neocortex as in the hippocampus [34].
(b) Spatial memory
One important algorithmic assumption was that the hippo-
campus and related structures are incapable of generating
systematic representations of their own and instead merely
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hints that this is incorrect had already been evident in the
discoveryof hippocampal place cells [39]. This led to the sugges-
tion that the hippocampus processes places and contexts [40].
The observation of place cells was followed by that of head-
direction cells reflecting directionality [41,42]; and of grid cells
which provide a metric for transitions through space [43,44].
Research on the human brain, using both intracranial electro-
physiological recording and functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) has confirmed the presence of place and grid
cells in humans [45–47]. The huge interest in spatial learning
and memory continues to this day.
This research has led to the conjecture that critical processing
by the hippocampal formation includes representation of
location within an orientationally anchored metric repre-
sentation of space, with recovery of past events involving
remembering where they took place. Much recent neural circuit
analysis is endeavouring to work out implementational details.
Howdiscrete events are represented, andhow theyare anchored
in present or future time and space to a specific context, remains
poorly understood—though the notion of the hippocampus
acting as a type of distributed associative memory [48–50] that
binds events to context has been discussed extensively in the
neuroscience literature [32,51,52]. Certainly, the recovery of the
stored representation of an event may now be seen to be one
that involves remembering where that event took place, a less
abstract process than that envisaged by Marr.(c) Cellular and subcellular processing
Marr providedwhat looked like a very clear guide to testing the
implementation of his model. However, it actually turns out to
be very difficult to do so convincingly. For instance, the degree
of abstraction necessary in treating all the complexities of the
internal connections within the hippocampus as being just
part of the output layer renders many of the implementational
suggestions rather moot. Thus, it can be criticized even at the
coarse level of connectivity at which the model could have
made contactwith the neural substrate—themore so for lacking
any information about the input–output relationship with the
neocortex. The theory was on far firmer ground at the level of
synaptic plasticity; and indeed, Marr mentioned (in a footnote)
Lømo’s initial observations about synaptic potentiation later
collected and expanded in the well-known paper of Bliss &
Lømo [53].
Certainly, he was prescient in imagining that the axonal
targets of inhibitory neurons could be on the cell soma or
the dendrites (e.g. figs. 3–5 of [3]). It took many years and
the elegant work of Somogyi and his colleagues in Oxford
before their combined electrophysiological, immunocyto-
chemical and ultrastructural studies at the single-cell level
confirmed that distinct types of inhibitory neuron within
the hippocampal formation (now at least 25 types) have
differential patterns of connectivity [54].
The existence of oscillatory activity in the hippocampus had
been established at the time of Marr’s paper, but he made no
reference to it. A theta rhythm (5–12 Hz) could be gating the
memory-encoding activity of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA)
receptors [55], or acting as a rapid phase-regulator of encoding
and retrieval [56]. Additional noteworthy rhythms include hip-
pocampal sharp waves seen in field-potentials, which Busza´ki
[57] has suggested may be mediating hippocampal–neocortical
interactions during consolidation and which have also beenimplicated in hippocampal replay after sleep [58]. New work
has suggested that gamma rhythms (30–80 Hz) may play a
role in gating the inputs to the hippocampal formation from
layer II and layer III of the entorhinal formation [59]. All these
ideas are at the forefront of experimentalworkwithmanydetails
to beworkedout, but it seemscertain thatMarrwouldhavebeen
excitedby thismore ‘dynamic’ conceptionofhis simplememory.
An implementational absentee from Marr’s theory was
neuromodulation. As well as their possible role in novelty,
dopamine neurons are also known to report prediction errors
associated with rewards [60], with similar potential consequen-
ces for memory [61,62]. Acetylcholine has been implicated in
modern versions of Marr’s theories, regulating synaptic drive
and efficacy so that retrieval of existing memories and storage
of new ones can be appropriately separated [63–65].
Regulation of synaptic efficacy is central to the capacity of
the memory to store information. Of the two types of synapse
envisaged by Marr, the Hebb synapse [20] was later identified
with long-term potentiation (LTP; [53,66]); the Brindley synapse
may exist but there is no firm evidence. Since 1971, once the
actions of glutamate on the four receptor subtypes, AMPA,
NMDA, kainate and mGLUR were understood (GLU-A,N,K
and M, respectively), many aspects of synaptic plasticity such
as associativity and cooperativity could be accounted for. Marr
might have been intrigued that the NMDA receptor has the bio-
physical properties necessary for detecting the conjunction of
presynaptic activity and postsynaptic depolarization, that is
then signalled with a different ion (Ca2þ) from that mediating
fast synaptic transmission by AMPA receptors (Naþ); and that
metabotropic glutamate receptors could inform postsynaptic
signalling cascades about the magnitude of presynaptic input
without regard to the level of postsynaptic depolarization. In
addition, the hippocampal slice preparation, allowing studies
in which drugs could be washed out as well as into living
brain, led to increased understanding of activity-dependent
synaptic plasticity, including the critical role that NMDA recep-
tors play at the time of induction [67]. Synapses are now
regarded as bidirectionally modifiable, exhibiting both LTP
and long-term depression (LTD), which has been shown to
have implications for storage capacity [68]. There are numerous
observations such as that blocking NMDA receptors impairs
memory formation [69], and the recent finding that synaptic
plasticity is also shown by inhibitory interneurons [70].(d) Pattern separation and pattern completion
Arising out of the modern interpretation of the dentate gyrus
and CA3 cells as the codon layer and the output layer,
respectively, there has been both experimental and theoretical
work on the role of the collaterals in taking partial patterns
and returning their original, complete, matches. One such
study involved the restricted genetic ablation of NMDA
receptors on pyramidal neurons in CA3 in mice, leaving
fast synaptic transmission intact but impairing plasticity
[71]. When trained on a spatial task with a rich set of extra-
maze cues, the knock-out mice were impaired when required
to recall with all but one cue absent (figure 3a). In rats whose
CA3 had undergone an excitotoxic lesion, there was a para-
metric disintegration in performance when required to
remember a maze location for a short period of time as
more spatial cues were removed (figure 3b; [72]).
Similar studies have been used to examine pattern separ-
ation, a function that Marr studied in great detail for his
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Figure 3. Complementary experimental work on pattern completion and pattern separation using different techniques. (a,b) Pattern completion. (a) Deletion of NMDA
receptors in area CA3 leads to problems finding the learned location of a hidden platform in a water maze only when most cues are removed (partial; lower). Place fields
(the spatial receptive fields of place cells) in area CA1 lose their integrity in the same circumstances (from Nakazawa et al. [71], reprinted with permission from AAAS).
(b) Experimental apparatus for examining pattern completion for spatial information (top). Rats were shown an object in one location (in the middle row, shown by the
little black object) during a ‘sample’ trial and then had to find its location again in a later ‘choice’ trial when some of the external cues were absent. Lesions of area CA3
led to a parametric impairment depending on the number of absent extra-maze cues (from Gold & Kesner [72], used with permission from Wiley-Liss, Inc.). (c,d) Pattern
separation. (c) In a similar apparatus to (b), rats performed a delayed match to sample task for the location of an object given an identical distractor object at various
separations. Lesions of the dentate gyrus caused a distance-specific deficit in this task (bottom) (from Gilbert et al. [73], used with permission from Wiley-Liss, Inc.). (d )
A molecular engineering approach showing selective deletion of the NR1 subunit in the dentate gyrus (top panel is a control mouse, bottom panel shows deletion).
These mice displayed a difficulty in discriminating two contexts in a fear-conditioning task (from McHugh et al. [74], reprinted with permission from AAAS). (e) Changes
in the distribution of rates of firing of simultaneously recorded neurons in CA3 (right, top) and DG (right, bottom) in an apparatus that could be gradually changed in
shape from a square to a circle. Panel shows trajectories of the animal and firing rate (left) and colour-coded rate maps (right). Note changes in rate of firing of CA3 cell
but ‘re-mapping’ by the DG neuron (from Leutgeb et al. [75], reprinted with permission from AAAS).
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the dentate gyrus (DG) have a similar function to granule
cells in Marr’s model of the cerebellum in mapping similar
input patterns to dissimilar representations. One study
showed that rats trained to distinguish the locations of two
objects were impaired selectively after DG lesions as an
inverse function of the spatial distance between the objects,
suggesting that pattern separation had been impaired
(figure 3c) [73]. Likewise, selective deletion of the NR1 sub-
unit of NMDA receptors in the DG of the mouse (impairing
plasticity rather than activity) resulted in animals able to
learn a context fear-conditioning task, but unable to dis-
tinguish two similar contexts associated with the learning
task (figure 3d ) [74]. Single-unit recordings from CA3
(figure 3e, upper) and DG (figure 3e, lower plot) by Leutgeb
et al. [75] have shown that signals from the entorhinal cortex
could be decorrelated by changes in the pattern of firing in
the dentate gyrus by the recruitment of non-overlapping
cell assemblies in CA3, consistent with the expectations of
Wills et al. [76]. Similar studies in humans, using fMRI,
have also been conducted [77].(e) A broader view of archicortex
Other computations have also been ascribed to the archicortex.
For instance, itmaybeas involved in constructing (i.e. imagining)
possible future events as it is in reconstructing (i.e. remembering)
past events [78–81]. This implicates it in mechanisms for plan-
ning, such as of possible trajectories in space [82,83]. Equally,
thehippocampusmightofferabstract representations for sensory
stimuli [84,85], effectively binding together disparate infor-
mation about objects in just the way that place cells bind
together disparate information to generate a code for location
[40].A third idea is that thehippocampus is a comparator, detect-
ing and highlighting unpredictability and anomalies. This has
implications for issues such as anxiety [86], and the influence
of noveltyonmemoryprocessing [55,87].Dopaminergic neurons
in theventral tegmental area (oneof the neuromodulatoryabsen-
tees mentioned above) might communicate novelty to the
hippocampus and thereby enhance the synaptic persistence of
associated events as outlined in the synaptic-tagging andcapture
theory [55,88,89], although the possibility of a contribution by
other neuromodulatory afferents needs also to be considered.
In either case, the simple memory could hold information for
rstb.
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memory consolidation process to favour these events, giving
rise to very long-lasting representations.royalsocietypublishing.org
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Neuroscience is maturing as a discipline and, despite frequent
comments to the contrary, we now know a great deal more
about the brain than we did in 1971. However, the relationship
between its empirical and theoretical branches is far from
mature. The modelling philosophy and methodology that
Marr created for his three detailed models of the 1970s, and
then substantially refined in Vision in 1982, remains influential
in theoretical circles. However, it is at risk of being forgotten by
the wider community where addressing mechanistic issues
without thinking about the functions or algorithms performed
in a brain area appears prevalent. In an essay broadly sym-
pathetic to the original tri-partite structure, Marr’s former
colleague Tommy Poggio finds himself wondering how evol-
ution and learning would fit in and whether they also
should be considered as separate levels [90]. An additional
concern is that the field is now polarizing around either imple-
mentational or computational explanations, with the danger of
the two never meeting. Marr’s legacy bears significantly on the
profitability of current endeavours of each type, including
hypothesis-free ‘omic’ neuroscience; for example, the collection
of immense amounts of data about the connections between all
neural elements [91] or global-scale mathematical modelling
without a specific computation in mind, such as attempts by
the Human Brain Project to build huge-scale simulations of
the brain (see https://www.humanbrainproject.eu). The
same could be said of implementation-free computational
approaches that aim to explore whether the brain functions
according to optimality principles.
Within the milieu of theoreticians seeking support for
their general theories of the brain, Marr was one of the first to
investigate whether specific computational tasks can be
implemented on the available neural machinery. A common
reading of his later work is that it is appropriate and sufficient
to start from the computational level; divorced from imple-
mentational considerations, information processing can be
readily formulated as optimal inference and control, using
ideas from fields such as statistics, operations research, econ-
omics and machine learning. However, as recognized
throughout the book Vision, these accounts are limited. In all
but the very simplest circumstances, optimal inference and con-
trol are radically intractable for animal or machine alike, and so
are formally limitedorevenuseless. It is essential touseheuristics
and approximations to the original computational specification.
The viability and ultimate performance of a heuristic depends
critically on the properties of the substrate on which it is
implemented. This opens a critical channel of reverse communi-
cation betweenMarr’s three levels. Marr recognizes this point in
Vision [6, ch. 7], which features imaginary dialogues between a
defender of the top-down approach and a sceptic, based on con-
versationsbetweenhimself, TommyPoggio andFrancisCrick. In
one exchange he accepts that the available neural infrastructure
may force a ‘poor man’s version’ of the computation to be
implemented rather than the computation itself [6, p. 339].
Bottom-up accounts that focus purely on the implemen-
tation are attractive because they treat neuroscience as any
other natural science. This provides a transparent way toconstruct models of neural phenomena at multiple scales of
investigation. However, these endeavours face two problems.
The first is that, as explained at length in Vision, such accounts
ignore the information processing problems—including the
fundamental problem of representation that is central to under-
standing the brain but is irrelevant, or certainly less relevant,
in most other domains of natural science. For example, for the
case of memory, without the notion of adequate retrieval of
past patterns from partial information, the elements and
neural circuits of the hippocampuswould seem incomprehensi-
bly complicated.As evident inMarr’s treatments, such concepts
can be a key source of constraints on the structure of the
implementation, which is most valuable in the face of the mag-
nitude of the problem. The second problem is one of
heterogeneity, which is more subtle and also more pernicious.
Conventional approaches to modelling natural phenomena
over multiple scales depend critically on homogeneity, i.e. that
the innumerable entities at the finer levels of description (such
as the sextillions of molecules in a gas, or the million or so cor-
tical nephrons in a human kidney, or the roughly 6000
sodium channels at a node of Ranvier of an axon) can be treated
as being at least statistically equivalent. These statistics can then
be averagedover time and/or space to derive approximate laws
of bulk behaviour applicable at a less detailed temporal or
spatial scale (such as the gas laws in physics, or the Hodgkin–
Huxley equations; [92]). This approach is the bread-and-butter
of statistical physics, with the macroscopic measures reflecting
the average properties of microscopic interactions. However,
many aspects of the brain are highly heterogeneous over
many temporal and spatial scales.
One implementational approach to heterogeneity is just to
measure it in all its complex richness—the ‘omics’ strategy.How-
ever, the number of suchmeasurements is impossibly large even
for a single organism (e.g. the location of every ion channel on
every dendrite). Worse, in a strongly nonlinear system such as
the brain in which microscopic changes can have macroscopic
effects, generalization across time, and between individuals, is
very hard. Building a nominally faithful bottom-up simulation,
as the Human Brain Project aims to do, is equally problematic.
A second implementational approach is to assume that the
heterogeneity of the brain arises from a deeper form of hom-
ogeneity, for instance, through a statistical sampling process,
and to try to work with the latter. One example is Marr’s
assumption that the input patterns of activity are generated
from independent samples drawn from a simple distribution.
Another is Peter’s principle that neurons choose to make
synapses randomly whenever an axon is sufficiently close to
a dendrite [93]. Unfortunately, such simple relationships do
not seem to hold—input patternswill actually contain substan-
tial correlations from shared coding; in consequence, cortical
wiring exhibits higher order relationships in which generating
and verifying more complicated forms is hard [94,95].
An alternative approach to the heterogeneity problem is to
argue that it arises through contingency, being tightly regulated
to realize algorithmic goals. The heterogeneity will therefore
reflect the developmental trajectoryof the organism—the expla-
nation for the precise strength of connections between
excitatory and inhibitory cells would be merely that it occurs
to ensure that excitation does not outweigh inhibition and
cause instability. Such effects would only be apparent in
deeply buried patterns of correlations in ‘omic’ observations,
ones that it would probably be impossible to extract without
the algorithmic understanding.
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David Marr sits comfortably with such luminaries as Norbert
Wiener, Warren McCulloch, Walter Pitts, Horace Barlow and
Donald MacKay as one of the most notable early theoretical
neuroscientists. Marr’s Philosophical Transactions paper
appeared in 1971, ironically the year of the first annual meet-
ing of the Society for Neuroscience—a meeting that now
attracts 30 000 attendees. Few of them may now know of
Marr, though many should. As we have tried to reflect, for
a paper that firmly embraces the complexities of the hippo-
campus (as opposed to concentrating on important but
narrower questions such as the mechanism by which spikes
are generated), it is quite remarkable how relevant it remains
to this day despite so much more now being known. Marr
was notably visionary, as well as impressively brave, and
he went to great lengths to show how his theories can, at
least in principle, be falsifiable. The Royal Society can take
credit for recognizing a special talent and allowing him to
publish his ideas at length in its journals.4Nevertheless, despite the prescience of this and his other
papers, their enduring legacy comes through their influence
on contemporary ideas about understanding particular sys-
tems of the brain in terms of the computations they carry
out with the neural hardware available. His methodology
gave the intellectual infrastructure within which almost all
subsequent modelling has been performed. He thereby pro-
vided a means to establish the communication between
levels that is necessary to make lasting progress, a lesson
that modern attempts that focus too narrowly on one level
at the expense of others ignore at their peril.
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